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Abstract
Empathy is a concept central to psychiatry, psychotherapy and clinical psychology. The construct
of empathy involves not only the affective experience of the other person's actual or inferred
emotional state but also some minimal recognition and understanding of another's emotional state.
It is proposed, in the light of multiple levels of analysis including social psychology, cognitive
neuroscience and clinical neuropsychology, a model of empathy that involves both bottom-up and
top-down information processing underpinned by parallel and distributed computational
mechanisms. The predictive validity of this model is explored with reference to clinical conditions.
As many psychiatric conditions are associated with deficits or even lack of empathy, we discuss a
limited number of these disorders including psychopathy/antisocial personality disorders,
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders, autistic spectrum disorders, and alexithymia. We
argue that future clinical investigations of empathy disorders can only be informative if behavioral,
dispositional and biological factors are combined.
Introduction
There is no dispute that empathy – the capacity to share
and understand emotional states of others in reference to
oneself – plays a critical role in human interpersonal
engagement and social interaction. In recent decades there
has been a flurry of interest in the domain of empathy in
various academic domains including philosophy of mind,
social psychology, developmental science and cognitive
neuroscience. Moreover, genuine cross-disciplinary work
has begun to investigate the cause, correlates and conse-
quences of empathy in typically developing children and
healthy individuals.
We believe that it is time to bring together conceptual the-
ories of empathy and recent empirical data in the context
of psychopathology. Two reasons motivated us to address
empathy in such a context. First, much of psychotherapy
depends on helping people to analyze and understand
their inner world to enable them to relate more appropri-
ately to their conspecifics. Second, many psychiatric disor-
ders are associated with empathy-related deficits. For
instance it is well documented that antisocial individuals
lack concern for others. The DSM-IV identifies a deficiency
in empathy as one of the essential features of narcissistic
personality disorder. Empathic deficits constitute a pri-
mary source of the autistic syndrome. This list, far from
exhaustive, illustrates the complexity of the psychological
construct of empathy, which explains why such a variety
and heterogeneity of mental disorders can be associated
with empathy.
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The goal of this paper is to provide an overarching frame-
work of empathy that articulates different components
with recent empirical data from neural science (including
neuropsychology). After clearing up definitional issues,
we present our framework, which considers that empathy
relies on both bottom-up and top-down information
processing and involves parallel and distributed process-
ing in a number of dissociable computational mecha-
nisms. Shared neural representations, self-other
awareness, mental flexibility and emotion regulation con-
stitute the basic macro-components of empathy, which
are mediated by specific and interacting neural systems.
Consequently, empathy-related disorders may occur from
dysfunction or disruption on each of these components.
We then discuss several psychopathological conditions,
which share lack of empathy and demonstrate how they
can be related to this framework.
What do we mean by empathy
There is an overabundance of operational definitions of
empathy. The construct of empathy denotes, at a phe-
nomenological level of description, a sense of similarity
between the feelings one experiences and those expressed
by others [1]. It can be conceived of as an interaction
between any two individuals, with one experiencing and
sharing the feeling of the other. Yet, empathic is not a
clear-cut expression. Specifically, empathy poses a para-
dox, as sharing of feelings does not necessarily imply that
one will act or even feel impelled to act in a supportive or
sympathetic way (empathy's paradox is that this ability
may be used for both helpful and hurtful purposes).
Empathy is a source of altruistic motivation, which under
certain circumstances may produce behavior that might
be judged moral but under other circumstances may pro-
duce behavior that might be judged immoral [2]. Moreo-
ver, the social and emotional situations eliciting empathy
can become quite complex depending on the feelings
experienced by the observed and the relationship of the
target to the observer [3]. The caveats demonstrate that
understanding others and experiencing their feelings
manifests in relation to oneself, illustrating the social
nature of the self, its inherent intersubjectivity.
Humans are indeed an intrinsically social and gregarious
species. And virtually all of their actions (including their
thoughts, desires, and feelings) are directed toward or are
produced in response to others [4]. Our survival critically
depends on social interactions with others. However, we
are also reasoning beings with flexibility and reflexivity.
This does not mean that basic emotion processing does
not play a role. Rather, emotions are embedded in reason-
ing involving evaluative appraisals.
Here we view empathy as a multidimensional construct to
account for the sense of sharing and understanding the
subjective experience of others. Thus empathy includes
aspects of emotion communication, self-awareness and
theory of mind.
The evolution of empathy
Natural selection has fine-tuned the mechanisms that
serve the specific demands of each species' ecology, and
social behaviors are best understood in the context of evo-
lution. However, one needs to point out that the literature
in comparative psychology and ethology is plagued by the
same limitations as the human literature regarding the dif-
ficulty to clearly differentiate true empathic reactions from
other emotional reactions such as personal distress.
The phylogenic origin of behaviors associated with social
engagement has been linked to the evolution of the auto-
nomic nervous system and how it relates to emotion.
According to Porges[5], social approach or withdraw stem
from the implicit computation of feelings of safety, dis-
comfort, or potential danger. He proposed that the evolu-
tion of the autonomic nervous system (sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems) provides a means to under-
stand the adaptative significance of the mammalian affec-
tive processes including empathy and the establishment
of lasting social bonds. These basic evaluative systems are
associated with motor responses that aid the adaptive
responding of the organism. At this primitive level, appe-
titive and aversive behavioral responses are modulated by
specific neural circuits in the brain that share common
neuroarchitecture among mammals [6]. These brain sys-
tems are genetically hard-wired to enable animals to
respond unconditionally to threatening, or appetitive,
stimuli using specific response patterns that are most
adaptive to the particular species and environmental con-
dition. The limbic system, which includes the hypothala-
mus, the parahippocampal cortex, the amygdala, and
several interconnected areas (septum, basal ganglia,
nucleus accumbens, insula, retrospenial cingulate cortex
and prefrontal cortex) is primarily responsible for emo-
tion processing. What unite these regions are their roles in
motivation and emotion, mediated by connections with
the autonomic system. The limbic system also projects to
the cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices, which are
involved with the regulation of emotion.
There is evidence for a lateralization of emotion process-
ing in humans and primates, which has been marshaled
under two distinct theories. One theory states that the
right hemisphere is primarily responsible for emotional
processing [7], while another one suggests that the right
hemisphere regulates negative emotion and the left hem-
isphere regulates positive emotion [8]. This asymmetry is
anatomically based on an asymmetrical representation of
homeostatic activity that originates from asymmetries in
the peripheral autonomic nervous system, and fits wellBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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with the homeostatic model of emotional awareness,
which posits that emotions are organized according to the
fundamental principle of autonomic opponency for the
management of physical and mental energy [9]. Support-
ing evidence for the lateralization of emotion comes from
neuroimaging studies and neuropsychological observa-
tions with brain damaged patients, but also studies in
non-human primates. In one study, tympanic membrane
temperature (Tty) was used to assess asymmetries in the
perception of emotional stimuli in chimpanzees [10]. The
tympanic membrane is an indirect, but reliable, site from
which to measure brain temperature, and is strongly influ-
enced by autonomic and behavioral activity. In that study,
chimpanzees were shown positive, neutral, and negative
emotional videos depicting scenes of play, scenery, and
severe aggression, respectively. During the negative emo-
tion condition, right Tty was significantly higher than the
baseline temperature. This effect was relatively stable,
long lasting, and consistent across individuals. Tempera-
tures did not change significantly from baseline in the
neutral or positive emotion condition, although a signifi-
cant number of measurements showed increased left Tty
during the neutral emotion condition. These data suggest
that viewing emotional stimuli results in asymmetrical
changes in brain temperature, in particular increased right
Tty during the negative emotion condition, evidence of
emotional arousal in chimpanzees, and in providing sup-
port right hemispheric asymmetry in our closest living
ancestor.
At the behavioral level it is evident from the descriptions
of comparative psychologists and ethologists that behav-
iors homologous to empathy can be observed in other
mammalian species. Notably, a variety of reports on ape
empathic reactions suggests that, apart from emotional
connectedness, apes have an explicit appreciation of the
other's situation [11]. A good example is consolation,
defined as reassurance behavior by an uninvolved
bystander towards one of the combatants in a previous
aggressive incident [12]. De Waal [11] has convincingly
argued that empathy is not an all-or-nothing phenome-
non, and many forms of empathy exist between the
extremes of mere agitation at the distress of another and
full understanding of their predicament. Many other com-
parative psychologists however view empathy as a kind of
induction process by which emotions, both positive and
negative, are shared, and by which the probabilities of
similar behavior are increased in the participants. In the
view developed in this paper, this is a necessary but not a
sufficient mechanism to account for the full-blown ability
of human empathy. However it does provide the basic
primitive, yet crucial mechanism on which empathy
develops. Indeed, some aspects of empathy are present in
other species, such as motor mimicry and emotion conta-
gion (see [13]). For instance, Parr [14] conducted an
experiment in which peripheral skin temperature (indi-
cating greater negative arousal) was measured in chim-
panzees while they were exposed to emotionally negative
video scenes. Results demonstrate that skin temperature
decreased when subjects viewed videos of conspecifics
injected with needles or videos of needles themselves, but
not videos of a conspecific chasing the veterinarian. Thus,
when chimpanzee are exposed to meaningful emotional
stimuli, they are subject to physiological changes similar
to those observed during fear in humans, which is similar
to the dispositional effects of emotional contagion [15].
In humans, the construct of empathy accounts for a more
complex psychological state than the one associated with
the automatic sharing of emotions. Like in other species,
emotions and feelings may be shared between individu-
als, but humans are also able to intentionally "feel for"
and act on behalf of other people whose experiences may
differ greatly from their own [16,17]. This phenomenon,
called empathic concern or sympathy, is often – but not
always – associated with prosocial behaviors such as help-
ing kin, and has been considered as a chief enabling proc-
ess for altruism [17]. Notably, Wilson [18] suggested that
empathic helping behavior has evolved because of its con-
tribution to genetic fitness (kin selection). In humans and
other mammals, an impulse to care for offspring is almost
certainly genetically hard-wired. It is far less clear that an
impulse to care for siblings, more remote kin, and similar
non-kin is genetically hard-wired [19]. The emergence of
altruism, of empathizing with and caring for those who
are not kin is thus not easily explained within the frame-
work of neo-Darwinian theories of natural selection.
Social learning explanations of kinship patterns in human
helping behavior are thus highly plausible. However, one
of the most striking aspects of human empathy is that it
can be felt for virtually any target – even targets of a differ-
ent species. In addition, as emphasized by Harris [20],
humans, unlike other primates, can put their emotions
into words, allowing them not only to express emotion
but also to report on current as well as past emotions.
These reports provide an opportunity to share, explain,
and regulate emotional experience with others that is not
found in other species. Conversation helps to develop
empathy, for it is often here that one learns of shared
experiences and feelings. Moreover, this self-reflexive
capability (which includes emotion regulation) may be an
important difference between humans and other animals
[21].
Interestingly two key regions, the anterior insula and ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), involved in affective process-
ing in general and empathy in particular have singularly
evolved in apes and humans. Cytoarchitectonic work by
Allman and colleagues [22] indicates that a population of
large spindle neurons is uniquely found in the anteriorBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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insula and anterior cingulate of humanoid primates. Most
notably, they reported a trenchant phylogenetic correla-
tion, in that spindle cells are most numerous in aged
humans, but progressively less numerous in children,
gorillas, bonobos and chimpanzees, and nonexistent in
macaque monkeys. Craig [23] recently suggested that
these spindle neurons interconnect the most advanced
portions of limbic sensory (anterior insula) and limbic
motor (ACC) cortices, both ipsilaterally and contralater-
ally, which, in sharp contrast to the tightly interconnected
and contiguous sensorimotor cortices, are situated physi-
cally far apart as a consequence of the pattern of evolu-
tionary development of limbic cortices. Thus, the spindle
neurons could enable fast, complex and highly integrated
emotional behaviors. In support of this view, convergent
functional imaging findings reveal that the anterior insula
and the anterior cingulate cortices are conjointly activated
during all human emotions. This, according to Craig [24],
indicates that the limbic sensory representation of subjec-
tive "feelings" (in the anterior insula) and the limbic
motor representation of volitional agency (in the anterior
cingulate) together form the fundamental neuroanatomi-
cal basis for all human emotions, consistent with the def-
inition of an emotion in humans as both a feeling and a
motivation with concomitant autonomic sequelae [25].
Overall, this evolutionary conceptual view is compatible
with the hypothesis that advanced levels of social cogni-
tion may have arisen as an emergent property of powerful
executive functioning assisted by the representational
properties of language [26]. However, these higher levels
operate on previous levels of organization, and should
not be seen as independent of, or conflicting with one
another. Evolution has constructed layers of increasing
complexity, from non-representational (e.g., emotion
contagion) to representational and meta-representational
mechanisms (e.g., sympathy), which need to be taken
into account for a full understanding of human empathy.
The components of empathy
For many psychologists, empathy implies at least three
different processes: feeling what another person is feeling;
knowing what another person is feeling; and having the
intention to respond compassionately to another person's
distress [1]. Yet, regardless of the particular terminology
that is used, there is broad agreement among scholars on
three primary aspects: 1) an affective response to another
person, which often, but not always, entails sharing that
person's emotional state, 2) a cognitive capacity to take
the perspective of the other person, and 3) some self-reg-
ulatory and monitoring mechanisms that modulate inner
states (e.g., [16,17,27,28]). According to Ickes [29], empa-
thy is a complex form of psychological inference in which
observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are
combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings
of others. As such, empathy involves not only the affective
experience of the other person's actual or inferred emo-
tional state but also some minimal recognition and
understanding of another's emotional state (or most
likely emotional state). This latter definition captures the
multidimensional nature of empathy and makes explicit
reference to some minimal mentalizing capacity. This lat-
ter concept refers to the broad social-cognitive ability used
by humans to explain and predict their own behavior and
that of others by attributing to them independent mental
states, such as belief, desires, emotions or intentions [30].
The model proposed here suggests that four major func-
tional components dynamically interact to produce the
experience of empathy:
1. Affective sharing between the self and the other, based
on the automatic perception-action coupling and result-
ing shared representations.
2. Self-awareness. Even when there is some temporary
identification between the observer and its target, there is
no confusion between self and other.
3. Mental flexibility to adopt the subjective perspective of
the other.
4. Regulatory processes that modulate the subjective feel-
ings associated with emotion.
In this view, none of these components can account solely
for the potential of human empathy. The four compo-
nents are intertwined and interact with one another to
produce the subjective experience of human empathy. For
instance, sharing emotion without self-awareness corre-
sponds to the phenomenon of emotional contagion,
which takes the form of 'total identification without dis-
crimination between one's feelings and those of the other
[11]. This model of empathy combines both representa-
tional aspects, i.e., memories that are localized in distrib-
uted neural networks that encode information and, when
temporarily activated, enable access to this stored infor-
mation, and processes, i.e., computational procedures
that are localized and are independent of the nature or
modality of the stimulus that is being processed (see Fig-
ure 1).
Like many emotion-related processes, some components
involved in empathy occur implicitly, without awareness,
in a bottom-up fashion. This is the case with the emotion-
sharing and motor mimicry aspects. Other components
require explicit top-down processing, such as perspective-
taking, representing our own thoughts and feelings as well
as those of others, and also some aspects of emotion reg-
ulation.BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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Affective sharing between self and other
In primates, the ability to understand emotional states of
others is critical for maintaining social interactions. One
powerful way to learn about the emotions expressed by
others is through emotional contagion. More complex
forms of emotions (such as social emotions) require the
awareness of one's own feelings in relation with, or in
response to social interaction.
Emotional expression and perception are an integral part
of any social interaction [31]. Bodily expressions consti-
tute an external, perceivable indication of people's inten-
tions and emotions. At one level, emotional expressions
are governed by rules and can be elicited by simple stim-
uli, as in the example of disgust in the presence of bitter
taste. However, humans as well as other animals also use
bodily expressions to communicate various types of infor-
mation to members of their own species. Understanding
other people's emotional signals has clear adaptive advan-
tages and is especially important in the formation and
maintenance of social relationships.
Social psychological research shows that humans mimic
unintentionally and unconsciously a wide range of behav-
iors, such as accents, tone of voice, rate of speech, posture
and mannerisms, as well as moods (e.g., [32]). This ten-
dency to automatically mimic and synchronize one's own
emotional behavior with that of others, also known as the
phenomenon of emotion contagion, facilitate the
smoothness of social interaction and may even foster
empathy [33]. For instance, a study demonstrated that
participants who had been mimicked by the experimenter
were more helpful and generous toward other people
than non-mimicked participants [34]. That study also
found that these beneficial consequences of mimicry were
not restricted to behavior directed toward the mimicker,
but included behavior directed toward people not directly
involved in the mimicry situation. Interestingly, individu-
als with autism, who are profoundly impaired in social
and emotional abilities, do not show spontaneous mim-
icry, but they perform voluntary mimicry well [35]. Such
a core deficit in involuntary motor resonance may be the
seed for their profound impairment in basic emotional
connectedness.
This automatic mapping between self and other is sup-
ported by considerable empirical literature in the domain
of perception and action, which has been marshaled
under the common-coding theory [36]. Its core assump-
tion is that actions are coded in terms of the perceivable
effects (i.e., the distal perceptual events) they should gen-
erate. This theory also states that perception of an action
activates action representations to the degree that the per-
ceived and the represented action are similar [37]. Fur-
thermore, these representations may be shared between
individuals. Indeed, the meaning of a given object, action,
or social situation may be common to several people and
may activate corresponding distributed patterns of neural
activation in their respective brains [38,39]. This sharing
explains how we come to understand each other; that is,
the isomorphism between action representations allows
the individual to implicitly know the goal of others
through the use of her or his own action representation
system.
In neurophysiology, direct evidence for the perception/
action coupling ranges from electrophysiological record-
ings in monkeys in which mirror neurons in the ventral
premotor and posterior parietal cortices fire during both
goal-directed actions and observation of the same actions
performed by another individual [40], to functional neu-
Schematic representation of the bottom-up (i.e., direct  matching between perception and action), and top-down  (i.e., regulation and control) information processes involved  in empathy Figure 1
Schematic representation of the bottom-up (i.e., direct 
matching between perception and action), and top-down 
(i.e., regulation and control) information processes involved 
in empathy. These two levels of processing are interrelated. 
The lower level, which is automatically activated (unless 
inhibited) by perceptual input, accounts for emotion sharing 
which leads to the implicit recognition that others are like us. 
Executive functions, implemented in the prefrontal cortex, 
serve to regulate both cognition and emotion, notably 
through selective attention and self-regulation. This meta-
level is continuously updated by bottom-up information, and 
in return controls the lower level by providing top-down 
input. Thus, top-down regulation, through executive func-
tions, modulates low levels and adds flexibility, making the 
individual less dependent on external cues. The meta-cogni-
tive feedback plays a crucial role in taking into account one's 
own mental competence in order to react (or not) to the 
affective states of others. However, subcortical systems do 
not lose their basic function, they may give up some of their 
autonomy in terms of the degree to which higher cortical 
systems can modulate their functions or regulate the emo-
tional experience (adapted from [168–170]).BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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roimaging experiments in humans that demonstrate that
the neural circuit involved in action execution overlaps
with that activated when actions are observed [41]. This
neural network includes the premotor cortex, the parietal
lobule, the supplementary motor area and the cerebel-
lum. In addition, a number of neuroimaging studies have
shown that similar brain areas are reliably activated while
imagining one's own action, imagining another's action,
and imitating actions performed by a model [42,43].
The perception-action mechanism accounts (at least
partly) for emotion sharing, which constitutes the core
mechanism for empathy [28]. This model posits that per-
ception of emotion activates in the observer the neural
mechanisms that are responsible for the generation of
similar emotion. Such a system prompts the observer to
resonate with the emotional state of another individual,
with the observer activating the motor representations
and associated autonomic and somatic responses that
stem from the observed target, i.e., a sort of inverse map-
ping. For example, while watching someone smile, the
observer activates the same facial muscles involved in pro-
ducing a smile at a subthreshold level and this would cre-
ate the corresponding feeling of happiness in the observer.
There is evidence for such a mechanism in the recognition
of emotion from facial expression. For instance, viewing
facial expressions triggers expressions on one's own face,
even in the absence of conscious recognition of the stim-
ulus [44,45]. Making a facial expression generates changes
in the autonomic nervous system and is associated with
feeling the corresponding emotion. In a series of experi-
ments, Levenson, Ekman and Friesen [46] instructed par-
ticipants to produce facial configurations for anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise while heart
rate, skin conductance, finger temperature, and somatic
activity were monitored. They found that such a voluntary
facial activity produced significant levels of subjective
experience of the associated emotions as well as specific
and reliable autonomic measures. Recently an fMRI exper-
iment confirmed and extended these findings by showing
that when participants are required to observe or to imi-
tate facial expressions of various emotions, increased neu-
rodynamic activity is detected in the superior temporal
sulcus, the anterior insula and the amygdala, as well as in
areas of the premotor cortex corresponding to the facial
representation [47].
The finding of paired deficits between emotion produc-
tion and emotion recognition also provides strong argu-
ments in favor of this model. A lesion study carried out
with a large number of neurological patients by Adolphs
and colleagues [48] found that damage within the right
somatosensory related cortices (including primary and
secondary somatosensory cortices, insula and anterior
supramarginal gyrus) impaired patients' ability to judge
other people's emotional states from viewing their face. A
study of brain-damaged individuals found that recogniz-
ing emotions from prosody draws on the right fronto-
parietal cortex [49]. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that the recognition of emotion in others
requires the perceiver to reconstruct images of somatic
and motoric components that would normally be associ-
ated with producing and experiencing the emotion sig-
naled in the stimulus [49].
Moreover, there are several dramatic case studies that sup-
port the idea that the same neural systems are involved
both in the recognition and in the expression of specific
emotion. Adolphs and colleagues [50] investigated S.M., a
30-year old patient, whose amygdala was bilaterally
destructed by a metabolic disorder. Consistent with the
prominent role of the amygdala in mediating certain neg-
atively valenced emotions such as fear, S.M. was found to
be impaired in both the recognition of fear from facial
expressions and in the phenomenological experience of
fear. Another case, N.M, who suffered from bilateral amy-
gdala damage and left thalamic lesion was found to be
impaired in recognizing fear from facial expressions and
exhibited an equivalent impairment of fear recognition
from body postures and emotional sounds [51]. The
patient also reported reduced anger and fear in his every-
day experience of emotion. There is also evidence for
paired deficits for the emotion of disgust. Calder, Keane,
Manes, Antoun and Young [52] described patient N.K.,
with left insula and putamen damage who was selectively
impaired in recognizing social signals of disgust from
multiple modalities (facial expressions, non-verbal
sounds, and emotional prosody), and who was less dis-
gusted than controls by disgust-provoking scenarios. Fur-
ther and direct support for a specific role of the left insula
in both the recognition and the experience of disgust was
recently provided by an fMRI study in which participants
inhaled odorants producing a strong feeling of disgust,
and in another condition, watched video clips showing
the facial expression of disgust. It was found that observ-
ing such facial expressions and feelings of disgust acti-
vated the same sites in the anterior insula and anterior
cingulate cortex [53].
The expression of pain provides a crucial signal, which can
motivate caring behaviors in others. Because there is
extensive behavioral and neurophysiological knowledge
about the experience of pain, studying the perception of
pain in others constitutes a valuable paradigm for investi-
gating the neural mechanisms underpinning empathy. A
single-neuron recording study in neurological patients
has documented pain-related neurons in the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) that respond both to actual stimula-
tion (thermal stimuli) and also to the observation of the
same stimuli delivered to another individual [54]. A firstBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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fMRI study demonstrated that the ACC, the anterior
insula, cerebellum, and brainstem were activated when
healthy participants experienced a painful stimulus, as
well as when they observed a signal indicating that
another person was receiving a similar stimulus. However,
only the actual experience of pain resulted in activation in
the somatosensory cortices and in dorsal ACC [55]. Simi-
lar results were also reported by Morrison and collabora-
tors [56] in a study in which participants were scanned
during a condition of feeling a moderately painful pin-
prick stimulus to the fingertips and another condition in
which they witnessed another person's hand undergo
similar stimulation. Both conditions resulted in common
neuro-hemodynamic increased activity in the right dorsal
ACC. This common activity in response to noxious tactile
and visual stimulation was restricted to the right inferior
Brodmann's area 24b. In contrast, the primary somatosen-
sory cortex showed significant activations in response to
noxious tactile, but not visual, stimuli. The different
response patterns in the two areas are consistent with the
ACC's role in coding the motivational-affective dimen-
sion of pain, which is associated with the preparation of
behavioral responses to aversive events. These findings are
supported by an fMRI study conducted by Jackson, Melt-
zoff and Decety [57] in which participants were shown
still photographs depicting right hands and feet in painful
or neutral everyday-life situations, and asked to imagine
the level of pain that these situations would produce. Sig-
nificant activation in regions involved in the affective
aspects of pain processing, notably the dorsal ACC, the
thalamus and the anterior insula was detected, but no
activity in the somatosensory cortex (see Figure 2). More-
over, the level of activity within the dorsal ACC was
strongly correlated with participants' mean ratings of pain
attributed to the different situations.
In a follow up fMRI study, Jackson and collaborators [58],
again using pictures of hands and feet in painful scenar-
ios, instructed the participants to imagine and rate the
level of pain perceived from two different perspectives
(self versus other). Results indicated that both the self and
the other perspectives are associated with activation in the
neural network involved in the processing of the affective
aspect of pain, including the dorsal ACC and the anterior
When individuals attend to the pain of others (like in b), activation is detected in the anterior ACC and SMA (a, b) and anterior  insula (c) Figure 2
When individuals attend to the pain of others (like in b), activation is detected in the anterior ACC and SMA (a, b) and anterior 
insula (c). Adapted from [57]. Neurophysiological research on pain points out a distinction between the sensory-discriminative 
aspect of pain processing and the affective-subjective one. These two aspects are underpinned by discrete yet interacting neu-
ral networks.BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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insula. However, the self-perspective yielded higher pain
ratings and involved the pain matrix more extensively,
including the secondary somatosensory cortex, the mid-
insula, and the caudal part of the anterior cingulate cortex.
Adopting the perspective of the other was associated with
increased activation in the right temporo-parietal junc-
tion. In addition, distinct subregions were activated
within the insular cortex for the two perspectives (anterior
aspect for others and more posterior for self). These neu-
roimaging data highlight both the similarities and self-
other distinctiveness as important aspects of human
empathy. The experience of pain in oneself is associated
with more caudal activations (within area 24), consistent
with spino-thalamic nociceptive projections, whereas the
perception of pain in others is represented in more rostral
(and dorsal) regions (within area 32). A similar rostro-
caudal organization is observed in the insula, which is
consistent with its anatomical connectivity and electro-
physiological properties [59]. For instance, painful sensa-
tions are evoked in the posterior part of the insula (and
not in the anterior part) by direct electrical stimulation of
the insular cortex in neurological patients [60]. Alto-
gether, these findings are in agreement with the fact that
indirect pain representations (as elicited by the observa-
tion of pain in others) are qualitatively different from the
actual experiences of pain.
However, studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) reported changes in corticospinal motor represen-
tations of hand muscles in individuals observing needles
penetrating hands or feet of a human model (e.g., [61]).
This indicates that the observation of pain can involve
sensorimotor representations. These findings are at odds
with fMRI studies of empathy for pain, which did not
detect any changes in the somatosensory cortex during the
perception of pain in others. It is possible that the TMS
method senses subtle changes in the sensorimotor cortex
that exist below the significance threshold in fMRI tech-
niques. A recent magnetoencephalographic study indi-
cated that somatosensory oscillations are modulated by
the perception of pain in others, and supports the idea
that pain perception elicits subtle somatosensory activity
[62]. Actually, a recent fMRI study using the same painful
picture task found activation extending to the primary
somatosensory areas in healthy participants [63]. It is also
known that attending to a specific body part elicits soma-
tosensory activity in the corresponding region. This has
been demonstrated in a positron emission tomography
study in which participants were instructed to focus their
attention either on the unpleasantness or the location of
the noxious stimuli delivered on the participants' hands –
with the latter condition resulting in increased regional
cerebral blood flow in the contralateral primary somato-
sensory cortex [64].
Altogether, shared representations between self and other
at the cortical level have been documented for action
understanding, some aspects of emotion, and pain
processing. This mechanism offers a foundation for inter-
subjectivity because it provides a functional bridge
between first-person information and third-person infor-
mation [38], which allows an automatic and non-con-
scious connection between the self and the other. There is
no specific cortical site for shared representations: their
neural underpinnings are widely distributed, and the pat-
tern of activation (and also presumably deactivation) var-
ies according to the processing domain, the particular
emotion, and the stored information. However, such a
mechanism is necessary but not sufficient for empathic
understanding. The awareness that others exist as separate
entities is a prerequisite component of empathy.
Self/other awareness
Individuals who are self-aware, as evidenced by being able
to become the object of their own attention, experience a
sense of psychological continuity over time and space
[65]. It has been speculated that any organisms capable of
self-recognition would have an introspective awareness of
their own mental states and the ability to ascribe mental
states to others [66]. A clear sense of self may have evolved
to solve at least two kinds of adaptive problems: 1) the self
is the repository of the social feedback one receives from
others and, 2) it allows one to model and understand the
internal, subjective worlds of others, making it easier to
infer intentions and causes that lay behind observed
behaviors, thus improving interaction efficacy [67]. Inter-
estingly, the development of self and other mental state
understanding is functionally linked to that of executive
functions, i.e., the processes that serve to monitor and
control thought and actions, including self-regulation,
planning, cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, and
resistance to interference [68]. There is increasingly clear
evidence of a specific developmental link between the
development of mentalizing and improved self-control at
around the age of 4 [69]. The development of cognitive
control is related to the maturation of the prefrontal cor-
tex [70]. In addition, there is hard evidence that a region
around the paracingulate sulcus in the medial prefrontal
cortex plays a specific role in mentalizing. This region con-
tains spindle cells, a class of large projection neurons
found only in great apes and humans, which are thought
to be involved in coordinating widely distributed neural
activity involving emotion and cognition [71]. This region
has been found to be reliably activated by mentalizing
tasks of various cognitive difficulties, ranging from judg-
ing the emotion in another person's gaze, to detection of
intention in simple dynamic animations, attribution of
intention to cartoons characters, story comprehension,
detection of social transgression, and appreciation of
humor [72].BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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Self-awareness does not rely on a specific brain region.
Rather, it arises from the interaction between processes
distributed in the brain, especially the prefrontal cortex
and the inferior parietal lobule. Neuropsychological
research supports a preeminent role for the right frontal
lobe in self-related processing. For instance, Keenan and
colleagues [73] demonstrated that patients undergoing a
Wada test were temporarily desensitized with regard to
the recognition of their own faces when the right hemi-
sphere was anaesthetized. This was not the case when the
left hemisphere was anesthetized. Right hemisphere dam-
age has also been found to be linked with impairments in
autobiographical memory and self-evaluation. Further-
more, clinical examination has shown that personal con-
fabulation (akin to the creation of fictitious stories about
the self) appears to be associated with damage to the right
frontal lobe [74].
Based on these numerous studies (and many others not
reviewed here), it was argued that the right hemisphere is
a key player in self-awareness and mental state attribution
[75]. It is worth noting that their definition of conscious-
ness includes awareness of one's own thoughts as well as
awareness of others thoughts. Similar (but not identical)
neural processing for self and other raises the question of
how we distinguish between representations activated by
the self and those activated by others.
Neuroscience research indicates that the right inferior
parietal cortex, in conjunction with prefrontal areas and
the insula, may be critical in distinguishing the self from
the other and therefore in navigating shared representa-
tions. The inferior parietal cortex is a heteromodal associ-
ation area, which receives input from the lateral and
posterior thalamus, as well as visual, auditory, somes-
thetic, and limbic areas. It has reciprocal connections to
the prefrontal cortex and to the temporal lobes [76]. These
multiple connections confer on this region a role in the
elaboration of an image of the body in space and in time
[77], on which the sense of agency depends. Accumulat-
ing empirical evidence indicates that the parietal cortex
plays a major role in the sense of agency in distinguishing
between self-produced actions and actions generated by
others [78,79] (for reviews). Interestingly, the right infe-
rior parietal cortex at the right temporo-parietal junction
is also involved when participants mentally simulate the
actions from a third-person perspective in comparison
with first-person perspective [80]. There are new findings
suggesting that this mechanism is also at play during
thinking about others. For instance, it has been demon-
strated that when participants are asked to adopt another
person's perspective to evaluate that person' beliefs [81],
imagine his or her feelings [82] and imaging his or her
pain [57,59] as compared with their own perspective, the
right inferior parietal cortex is strongly involved.
Recently, Decety and Lamm [83] conducted a quantitative
meta-analysis of 70 functional neuroimaging studies on
agency, empathy, theory of mind, as well as on reorienting
of attention. The results demonstrate a substantial overlap
in brain activation between low-level processing such as
reorienting of attention or the sense of agency and higher-
level social-cognitive abilities such as empathy or theory
of mind (see Figure 3). These results provide strong empir-
ical support for a domain-general mechanism imple-
mented in the right TPJ, and show that this area is also
engaged in lower-level (bottom-up) computational proc-
esses associated with the sense of agency and reorienting
attention to salient stimuli.
All the aforementioned evidence strongly suggests that the
inferior parietal cortex, in conjunction with the prefrontal
cortex and the anterior insula, plays a pivotal role in the
sense of self by comparing the source of sensory signals
(whether they originate from the self or from the environ-
ment). Such a function is crucial for empathy in order to
maintain a minimal distinction between the self and the
other and to keep track of the origin of the feelings. Self-
awareness and agency are crucial for navigating the shared
nature of our joint representations, and are essential prop-
erties of any autonomous agent. Indeed, social cognition
relies both on similarities and differences between indi-
viduals.
Overlap of activation between reorienting, empathy and the- ory of mind, projected on a partially inflated lateral view of  the PALS-B12 brain atlas Figure 3
Overlap of activation between reorienting, empathy and the-
ory of mind, projected on a partially inflated lateral view of 
the PALS-B12 brain atlas. The yellow to orange colors code 
the probability of activation, with brighter yellow indicating 
higher activation probability (Adapted from [83]).BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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Mental flexibility and perspective taking
Empathy may be initiated by a variety of situations, for
instance by seeing another person in distress or in discom-
fort, by imagining someone else's behavior, by reading a
narrative in a fiction book or by seeing a moving TV-
report. However, in these conditions, empathy requires
one to adopt more or less consciously the subjective point
of view of the other in relation to oneself.
Several social psychologists have suggested and docu-
mented through empirical work that our default mode to
reasoning about others is biased toward self-perspective
and that this constitutes a general feature of human cog-
nition (e.g., [84,85]). Self-knowledge may serve as an
anchor point for understanding others [86]. Stated in
other words, people are fundamentally egocentric and
have difficulty getting beyond their own perspective when
anticipating what others are thinking or feeling, especially
when trying to understand the states of mind of people
who are perceived as being similar to themselves. Usually
people are unaware of this projective tendency, which also
applies to goals. This view is consistent with the shared
representations mechanism. One sees others through
one's own embodied cognition and uses one's own
knowledge (including beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and
feelings) as the primary basis for understanding others
[17,38]. Self-perspective may thus be considered as the
default mode of the human mind. It is a very parsimoni-
ous and advantageous mechanism for understanding and
predicting the behavior of others. Yet it is far from perfect,
as individual differences in people's thoughts and emo-
tions abound. Errors in taking the perspective of others
stem from the inability to suppress the self-perspective,
and many costly social misunderstandings are rooted in
people's failure to recognize the degree to which their con-
struals of a situation may differ from those of others [17].
For successful social interaction, and empathic under-
standing in particular, an adjustment must operate on
these shared representations. Whereas the projection of
self-traits onto the other does not necessitate any signifi-
cant store of knowledge about the other, empathic under-
standing requires the inclusion of other characteristics
within the self. An essential aspect of empathy is to recog-
nize the other person as like the self, while maintaining a
clear separation between self and other. Hence, mental
flexibility and self-regulation are important components
of empathy. One needs to calibrate one's own perspective
that has been activated by the interaction with the other,
or even by its mere imagination. Such calibration requires
the prefrontal cortex executive resources, as demonstrated
by neuroimaging studies in healthy participants as well as
neuropsychological observations.
Several neuroimaging studies have consistently reported
that the medial prefrontal cortex is specifically involved in
tasks requiring the processing of information relevant to
the self, such as traits and attitudes (e.g., [87]). An fMRI
study investigated the neural regions mediating self refer-
ential processing of emotional stimuli and explored how
these regions are influenced by the emotional valence of
the stimulus [88]. Results showed that the self-referential
condition induced bilateral activation in the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, whereas the other referential condition
induced activation in lateral prefrontal areas. Activation in
the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was specific to the
self-referential condition regardless of the valence of the
words. The authors of that study proposed that one spe-
cific role of the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is to
represent states of an emotional episodic "self" and then
to process emotional stimuli with a personally relevant
perspective. This proposition is in line with studies show-
ing activations within both the left and right dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex during "theory of mind" tasks [89].
Because emotions generally signal issues related to the
self, subjects may use emotional cues during some theory
of mind tasks to differentiate self from other; this self-
related emotional processing is indicated by an increase of
activity in the right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
However, the medial prefrontal cortex is not only
involved when one reflects on oneself, but also when indi-
viduals intentionally adopt the subjective perspective of
others. A series of three neuroimaging studies with
healthy volunteers investigated the neural underpinning
of perspective taking in three different modalities (i.e.,
motoric, conceptual, and emotional) of self-other repre-
sentations. In a first study, participants were scanned
while they were asked to either imagine themselves per-
forming a variety of everyday actions (e.g., winding a
watch), or to imagine another individual performing sim-
ilar actions [80]. Both conditions were associated with
common activation in the supplementary motor area
(SMA), premotor cortex, and the occipito-temporal
region. This neural network corresponds to the shared
motor representations between the self and the other. Tak-
ing the perspective of the other to simulate his or her
behavior resulted in selective activation of the frontopolar
cortex and right inferior parietal lobule. In a second study,
medical students were shown a series of affirmative
health-related sentences (e.g., taking antibiotic drugs
causes general fatigue) and were asked to judge their
truthfulness either according to their own perspective
(i.e., as experts in medical knowledge) or according to the
perspective of a layperson [81]. The set of activated
regions recruited when the participants put themselves in
the shoes of a lay-person included the medial prefrontal
cortex, the frontopolar cortex and the right inferior pari-
etal lobule. In a third study, the participants were pre-BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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sented with short written sentences that depicted real-life
situations (e.g., someone opens the toilet door that you
have forgotten to lock), which are likely to induce social
emotions (e.g., shame, guilt, pride), or other situations
that were emotionally neutral [82]. In one condition, they
were asked to imagine how they would feel if they were
experiencing these situations. And in another condition,
they were asked to imagine how their mothers would feel
in those situations. Reaction times were statistically
greater when the participants imagined emotional-laden
situations as compared with neutral ones, both from their
own perspective and from the perspective of their moth-
ers. Neurodynamic changes were detected in the fron-
topolar cortex, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the
medial prefrontal cortex, and the right inferior parietal
lobule when the participants adopted the perspective of
their mothers, regardless of the affective content of the sit-
uations depicted. Cortical regions that are involved in
emotional processing, including the amygdala and the
temporal poles, were found activated in the conditions
that integrated emotional-laden situations. Consistent
findings were reported from a functional MRI study in
which participants were asked to make food preference
judgments about themselves or about someone else (a
person whom they knew fairly well). Self-judgments were
associated with increases in the medial prefrontal cortex,
the anterior insula, and secondary somatosensory areas.
Judgments of the other resulted in activation of the medial
prefrontal cortex, the frontopolar cortex, and the posterior
cingulate [90].
A recent functional MRI study used a factorial design to
examine the neural correlates of self-reflection and per-
spective taking [91]. Participants were asked to judge the
extent to which trait adjectives described their own per-
sonality (e.g., "Are you sociable?") or the personality of a
close friend (e.g., "Is Caroline sociable?") and were also
asked to put themselves in the place of their friend (i.e., to
take a third-person perspective) and estimate how this
person would judge the adjectives, with the target of the
judgments again being either the self (e.g., "According to
Caroline, are you sociable?") or the other person (e.g.,
"According to Caroline, is she sociable?"). The results
showed that self-referential processing (i.e., judgments
targeting the self vs. the other person) was associated with
activation in the ventral and dorsal anterior MPFC,
whereas perspective taking (i.e., adopting the other per-
son's perspective, rather than one's own, when making
judgments) resulted in activation in the posterior dorsal
MPFC; the interaction between the two dimensions
yielded activation in the left dorsal MPFC. Findings from
this study indicate that self-referential processing and per-
spective-taking recruit distinct regions of the MPFC and
suggest that the left dorsal MPFC may be involved in
decoupling one's own from other people's perspectives on
the self.
One of the most striking findings of the studies that inves-
tigated self- versus other's perspective is the systematic
involvement of the frontopolar cortex, medial prefrontal
cortex, posterior cingulate, and right temporo-parietal
junction when the participants adopt the perspective of
another person (a circuit also associated with theory of
mind tasks). Converging evidence from clinical neuropsy-
chology and neuroscience points to the frontopolar cortex
as being chiefly involved in inhibitory or regulating
processing. Frontal damage may result in impaired per-
spective-taking ability and a lack of cognitive flexibility
[92]. Anderson and colleagues [93] reported the cases of
two patients with early damage to the anterior prefrontal
cortex (encompassing the frontopolar cortex) who, when
tested on moral dilemmas, exhibited an excessively ego-
centric perspective. A major study of patients with limited
focal lesions to the frontal lobes, who were tested for vis-
ual perspective taking and detecting deception, revealed a
dissociation of performance within the frontal lobes [94].
Right frontal lobe lesions were associated with impaired
visual perspective taking, whereas medial frontal lesions,
particularly right ventral, were associated with impaired
detection of deception.
Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that an
inhibitory component is required to regulate and tone
down the self-perspective tendency and allow the cogni-
tive and affective flexibility necessary to the evaluation of
the other's perspective. Such a view is compatible with the
role of the prefrontal cortex in top-down control of behav-
ior [95]. An alternative interpretation of the role of the
frontopolar cortex in adopting the perspective of another
individual is based on the distinction between different
psychological operations mediated by distinct subregions
of the prefrontal cortex. There is evidence that the fron-
topolar cortex is involved in the process of evaluating self-
generated responses, and is recruited when the task
requires monitoring and manipulation of information
that has been internally represented [96]. Adopting the
subjective perspective of another individual to understand
her feelings is a self-generated process that operates on
internally represented information fed by the internal
activation of shared representations.
Emotion regulation
The capacity to regulate one's own emotions has a clear
adaptive function for social interaction, both for the indi-
vidual and the species. It has been demonstrated that indi-
viduals who can regulate their emotions are more likely to
experience empathy, and also to act in morally desirable
ways with others [97]. Emotion regulation refers to the
processes by which individuals influence which emotionsBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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they have, when they have them, and how they experience
and express these emotions [98]. It also applies to the
modulation of the behavioral and the physiological
dimensions of emotion.
It is likely that the emotional state and affective conse-
quences generated in the self from the perception or imag-
ination of the other's affective state requires some
regulation and control for the experience of empathy.
Indeed, without such control, the mere activation of the
perception-action mechanism, including the associated
autonomic and somatic responses, could lead to emo-
tional contagion or emotional distress. Such regulation is
also important in modulating one's own vicarious emo-
tion so that it is not experienced as aversive. Previous
research indicates that emotion regulation is positively
related to feelings of concern for the other person [97,99].
In contrast, individuals who experience their emotions
intensely, especially negative emotions, are prone to per-
sonal distress, i.e., an aversive emotional reaction such as
anxiety or discomfort based on the recognition of
another's emotional state or condition [100]. Chronic
incapacity to suppress negative emotion may be a key fac-
tor in anxiety, and aggressive and violent behavior [101].
A circuit that includes several interconnected regions of
the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, hippocampus, ACC,
insular cortex, and ventral striatum has been acknowl-
edged to be implicated in various aspects of emotion reg-
ulation [102]. In neurology, the term "self-regulatory
disorder" has been coined for the syndrome exhibited by
patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage (par-
ticularly on the right). This syndrome is defined as the ina-
bility to regulate behavior according to internal goals and
constraints [103]. It arises from the inability to hold a
mental representation of the self on-line and to use this
self-related information to inhibit inappropriate
responses. Interestingly, the orbitofrontal, ventromedial,
and dorsolateral cortices have been reported in the neuro-
logical literature to be involved in empathy. Notably,
damage to the orbitofrontal is associated with a wide
range of social emotional deficits, including impaired
social judgment and disinhibited behavior. For instance,
Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight [104] found that patients
with bilateral lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex are
impaired in the "faux pas" task. This task requires both an
understanding of false or mistaken belief and an appreci-
ation of the emotional impact of a statement on the lis-
tener. A study conducted by Stuss and colleagues [94]
extended this finding by showing that only lesions in the
right orbitofrontal produce such a deficit. In addition, a
number of clinical studies reported a relationship
between the deficit in empathy and poor performance of
cognitive flexibility tasks among patients with lesions in
the dorsolateral regions, whereas those with orbitofrontal
cortex lesions were more impaired in empathy but not in
cognitive flexibility [105,106]. The ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex with its reciprocal connections with brain
regions involved in emotional processing (amygdala),
memory (hippocampus), and executive functions (dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex) plays also a major role in emo-
tion regulation. Damasio's [107] somatic markers
hypothesis, which posits that memories of somatic states
that are associated with particular experiences or out-
comes are stored in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is
directly relevant in the process of affective regulation.
Recent work by Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues [108] sup-
ports this hypothesis. They tested patients with lesions of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex with three theory-of-mind tasks (second-
order beliefs and faux pas) that differed in the level of
emotional processing involved. They found that patients
with ventromedial lesions were most impaired in the faux
pas task but presented normal performance in the second-
order belief tasks. The authors further argued that in order
to detect faux pas, one is required not only to understand
the knowledge of the other but also to have empathic
understanding of other's feelings. Finally, the ACC is part
of a circuit involved in a form of attention that serves to
regulate both cognitive and emotional processing [109].
Its lesion produces a host of symptoms, which include
apathy, inattention, dysregulation of autonomic func-
tions, and emotional instability.
Neuroimaging research has recently begun to investigate
neural mechanisms involved in affective reappraisal, a
cognitive strategy used to regulate emotion. For instance,
an fMRI experiment on emotion reappraisal has detected
co-activation of the lateral prefrontal and medial prefron-
tal cortices and decreased activity in the medial orbitof-
rontal cortex and the amygdala [110]. Another study
identified a circuit composed of the right orbitofrontal,
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate
for voluntary suppression of sadness [111]. One recent
functional MRI study investigated whether observation of
distress in others leads to empathic concern and altruistic
motivation or to personal distress and egoistic motivation
[112]. In this experiment behavioral measures and event-
related functional MRI were used to explore the effect of
perspective taking and emotion regulation on empathy
processing while participants watched video-clips of
patients expressing pain resulting from medical treat-
ment. Video-clips were presented either with the instruc-
tion to imagine the feelings of the patient ("imagine
other") or to imagine oneself to be in the patient's situa-
tion ("imagine self"). Need for emotion regulation was
manipulated by providing information that the medical
treatment had or had not be successful. Behavioral meas-
ures clearly demonstrated that imagery and reappraisal
instructions were effective. Neuroimaging data showedBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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consistent activity in the insular cortex and anterior
medial cingulate cortex (aMCC). Graded responses
related to the imagery instructions were observed in dor-
sal insula, aMCC, and left and right parietal cortex. Emo-
tion regulation resulted in hemodynamic changes in
anterior paracingulate cortex, subgenual ACC, orbitofron-
tal, and right temporal cortex. These findings support the
view that the response to the pain of others can be modu-
lated by cognitive and motivational processes. These proc-
esses influence whether observing a conspecific in need of
help will result in empathic concern, an important prereq-
uisite for helping behavior.
Overall, the capacity to regulate emotions is an important
aspect of our ability to interact appropriately with other
people. The prefrontal cortex is highly differentiated in
terms of cell structures and patterns of interconnectivity
with other cortical subsystems. In line with this fact, neu-
roimaging studies suggest that specific systems interact in
generating emotion regulation. Social neuroscience is
beginning to shed light on the physiological and neural
mechanisms subserving the various emotion regulation
strategies that allow us to better understand our conspecif-
ics.
Empathy relies on intersubjective awareness
The way our nervous system is organized and tailored by
evolution provides the basic biological mechanism for
resonating with the behaviors of others. This mechanism
driven by the common coding between perception and
action provides the default mode to implicitly relate to
others and may be responsible for the projective tendency
to ascribe one's own characteristics and self-traits to others
[38,113]. However, this tendency needs to be regulated
(or calibrated) for appropriate social interaction [17]. This
requires additional computational mechanisms, includ-
ing monitoring and manipulation of internal information
generated by the activation of the shared representations
between the self and the other. In addition, there are lim-
its to the extent to which the experiences are isomorphic,
as demonstrated by the non-overlapping neural areas.
One of the core components of empathy relies on the
unconscious neural/mental simulation of the emotional
state of others. This idea is far from new (e.g.,
[107,114,115]). For instance, Ax [116] in 1964 had sug-
gested that empathy might be thought of as an autonomic
nervous system state, which tends to simulate that of
another person. This idea fits neatly with the notion of
embodiment, which refers both to actual bodily states and
to simulations of experience in the brain's modality-spe-
cific systems for perception, action, and the introspective
systems that underlie conscious experiences of emotion,
motivation and cognitive operations [117]. However, this
simulation is not exclusively under automatic manage-
ment and, at least in humans, falls under conscious con-
trol. This makes empathy, as described here, an
intentional capacity. Without self-awareness and emotion
regulation processing, there may be no true empathy. The
automatic activation of shared representations would
instead be associated with anxiety and discomfort and
would lead to responses oriented to the self (e.g., emo-
tional distress). Such a formulation is also consistent with
the observation that prosocial behaviors, which stem
from empathy, emerge during child development in par-
allel with self-conscious emotions [118]. These emotions
require self-evaluation and comparison with others, as
well as some form of emotion regulation. Forming an
explicit representation of another person's feeling, as an
intentional agent, thus necessitates additional computa-
tional mechanisms beyond the shared representation
level. This requires that second-order representations of
the other are available to consciousness (a decoupling
mechanism between first-person information and sec-
ond-person information) [119].
Thus human empathy cannot be described only as a sim-
ple resonance of affect between the self and other. Indeed,
empathy is both about sharing and understanding the
emotional state of others in relation to oneself. The capac-
ity for two people to resonate with each other emotion-
ally, prior to any cognitive understanding, is the basis for
developing shared emotional meanings, but is not suffi-
cient for empathy. Such an understanding goes beyond
this reflex-like response. It involves an explicit representa-
tion of the subjectivity of the other and a minimal self-
other distinction. Recent neuroimaging investigations of
the perception of pain in others support such a view (e.g.,
[55,57,58,112]). Indeed, all these studies have shown that
part of the neural network (including the anterior cingu-
late cortex and the anterior insula) mediating self-experi-
enced pain is shared when empathizing or observing the
pain in others, and also that non-overlapping aspects
within these regions are specifically activated for the self
or the other. This supports the idea that personal and
vicarious experiences at some level differ physiologically
[120] and result in qualitatively distinct responses.
Finally, empathy also necessitates emotion regulation in
which the ventral prefrontal cortex, with its strong con-
nections with the limbic system, dorsolateral, and medial
prefrontal areas, plays an important role.
We believe that a greater understanding of the underlying
computational processes and their neural underpinnings
can contribute to a better characterization of empathy dis-
orders in psychopathology.
Empathy disorders and psychopathology
The empirical evidence reviewed here illuminates the neu-
robiological underpinnings of the different componentsBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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of empathy and strongly suggests the view that lesion to
different cortical and sub-cortical structures or circuits can
lead to an alteration of empathy or even a lack of
empathic ability. However qualitative differences exist in
the nature of underlying deficits, and this supports our
assertion that empathy entails a number of distinct com-
ponents mediated by isolable neural systems. It is possi-
ble that psychopathological disorders such as antisocial
personality disorders, schizophrenia or autism, in which
social breakdown are predominant for various reasons,
will benefit from this integrative model. The clinical
imperative is to understand the factors that lead to these
conditions, uncover what neural mechanisms may under-
lie these deficits, and hence treat them.
Many psychiatric disorders are associated with deficits or
even lack of empathy. Here, we will discuss a limited
number of these disorders including psychopathy/antiso-
cial personality disorders, borderline and narcissistic per-
sonality disorders, autistic spectrum disorders, and
alexithymia.
Psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder (ASP)
Psychopathy is a disorder that encapsulates the essence of
a lack of empathy. The classification of psychopathy,
introduced by Hare [121], involves both affective-inter-
personal (e.g., lack of empathy and guilt) and behavioral
components (e.g., criminal activity and poor behavioral
control).
Empathy deficit in antisocial personality disorder has
been suggested to come from a reduced ability to feel
other people's emotional state, and more so for sadness
and fear [122]. This deficit has been ascribed to a dysfunc-
tion in the amygdala of developmental origin. This view is
compatible with the fact that individuals with this disor-
der have generally intact executive functions and can suc-
cessfully complete Theory of Mind tasks [121]. There is
also evidence to suggest that psychopathic patients do
well on the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task by simply
asking them to focus on the eyes of other target people
[123]. Therefore, their lack of empathy could be related to
disrupted affective processing rather than an inability, for
instance, to adopt the perspective of others. In fact, people
with antisocial personality disorders are probably good at
perceiving others' intentions, while disregarding the emo-
tional content, however, and thus may take advantage of
it. This is precisely what the research of Mealey [124] sug-
gests. The psychopath cannot simulate emotions he can-
not experience, and must rely exclusively on cognitive
inputs to his theory of mind mechanism.
An interesting single case of acquired sociopathy has been
reported by Blair and Cipolotti [125]. The authors investi-
gated an individual, J.S., with orbitofrontal cortex and left
amygdala damage with an impressive battery of measures,
including skin conductance response (SRC), tests of exec-
utive functions, emotion recognition and social cognition
tasks. While J.S. showed executive impairments but no
reversal learning impairment, he was significantly
impaired on most of the social cognition tasks. Notably,
he was both impaired in the recognition of emotional
expressions (happiness, anger, disgust and sadness) and
in the attribution of emotional states to others (fear, anger
and embarrassment). His ability to attribute mental states
to others was preserved. His SRC responses to negative
emotional expressions were reduced. Blair and Cipolotti
argued that the distinctive features of the acquired sociop-
athy of J.S. were due to impairment of a system which
responds to angry expressions/expectations of others'
anger, and that this system is particularly involved in the
suppression of socially aberrant behavior.
Antisocial personalities are often reported to perform
poorly on neuropsychological tests of executive function-
ing (e.g., [126]). Executive functions are considered neces-
sary for socially appropriate conduct, and in our
framework, they contribute to empathy through self-regu-
lation. In line with this view, a meta-analysis of thirty-
nine studies (yielding a total of 4589 participants) helped
to clarify the relation between antisocial behavior and
executive functions [127]. The results of this meta-analysis
indicate that there is a robust and statistically significant
relation between executive functions and antisocial
behavior. The authors were unable to subdivide executive
function measure in terms of their associations with dif-
ferent brain regions (e.g., dorsolateral, orbitofrontal)
because of the lack of knowledge concerning the neuroan-
atomical substrates of most executive functions tasks.
Interestingly, Blair [122] proposed that people with anti-
social personalities have a disruption of a violence inhibi-
tion mechanism that is normally triggered by distress cues
of others, and this aspect belongs to executive function-
ing.
Clinical and forensic research usually distinguish "affec-
tive" or "reactive" aggression, which is a response to phys-
ical or verbal aggression initiated by others with violence
that is relatively uncontrolled and emotionally charged,
from a "predatory" or "instrumental" cold-blooded
aggression, which is a controlled, purposeful aggression
lacking in emotion that is used to achieve a desired goal
[128]. Our model of empathy predicts that the former
type of personality would lack executive control (particu-
larly self-control) and emotion regulation, whereas the
latter personality would have some dysfunctions in shar-
ing feelings with others. Interestingly, measurements of
glucose metabolism in two groups of affective and preda-
tory murderers have shown that the first group has lower
prefrontal activity, and the second group has similar pre-BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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frontal activity as compared to controls, but lower activity
at the subcortical level including the amygdala [129].
Borderline and narcissistic personality disorder (BPD/NPD)
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is characterized by
emotional dysregulation, "splitting" (or black and white)
thinking, and fluctuating and chaotic interpersonal rela-
tionships, including pervasive instability in mood, inter-
personal relationships, identity, and behavior, as well as a
disturbance in the individual's sense of self. They often
have severe deficiencies in impulse control, which results
in self-destructive behaviors, burst aggression to others.
Abnormalities of brain function have been assumed in the
areas associated with cognition, affect, emotion regula-
tion, and impulsivity, particularly in the prefrontal cortex
and the temporal lobe, including the amygdala and/or
hippocampus. In accord with this notion, patients with
BPD showed enhanced amygdala activation in response
to standardized emotionally aversive pictures [130]. Don-
egan et al [131] reported that BPD patients showed signif-
icantly greater left amygdala activation to the facial
expressions of emotion compared with healthy subjects,
and in post-scan debriefing some patients had difficulty
disambiguating neutral faces or found them threatening.
Minzenberg and colleagues [132] also confirmed BPD
group exhibiting significantly greater activation in the
right amygdala to fear minus neutral facial expressions,
and a significantly larger magnitude of deactivation on
(relative to healthy control) in the bilateral rostral/sub-
genual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) to fear and in the
left ACC to fear minus neutral; and they concluded that
BPD patients exhibit changes in fronto-limbic activity in
the processing of fear stimuli, with exaggerated bilateral
amygdala response and impaired emotion-modulation of
ACC activity. A FDG-PET study demonstrated a tight cou-
pling of glucose metabolic activity in resting condition
between right OFC and ventral amygdala in healthy sub-
jects with dorso-ventral differences in amygdala circuitry,
but not present in BPD group, without any significant dif-
ferences in amygdala volumes or metabolism between
BPD patients and controls.
All these studies described above suggest that BPD
includes 'hyper-sensitivity' in the limbic system primarily
including the amygdala and a hypofunction of the pre-
frontal cortices. In the context of empathy, both emo-
tional and cognitive function and interaction between
two components may be altered in patients with BPD.
From a clinical point of view, Kernberg [133] proposed
psychopathological diagnostic criteria of borderline per-
sonality organization: impaired ego integration with
"primitive defenses" like 'splitting', in which a person or
thing is seen as alternative and fluctuating 'all good' or 'all
bad', problems with object constancy and continuity in
people and things in their lives, and 'projection' of
unpleasant characteristics in the self onto others and 'pro-
jective identification', a process where the borderline tries
to elicit in others the feelings he/she is having. These
notions are in line with their self-oriented immature level
of empathy (e.g., personal distress or posing their mental
state on the other), that is, over-affective and exaggerated
resonance with other's mental state with lowered top-
down modulation by correct meta-cognitive process.
People with narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) also
have difficulty recognizing the needs and feelings of oth-
ers, and are dismissive, contemptuous and impatient
when others share or discuss their concerns or problems.
They are also oblivious to the hurtfulness of their behavior
or remarks, show an emotional coldness and a lack of
reciprocal interest, exhibit envy (especially when others
are accorded recognition), have an arrogant, disdainful
and patronizing attitude, and are quick to blame and crit-
icize others when their needs and expectations are not
met. Although there is scarcely neuroscientific evidence in
NPD (c.f., [134]), underpinnings of the lack of empathy
in NPD seem common with that in BPD, although it is
supposed that BPD contains dysregulation in more affec-
tive aspects than NPD from empirical clinical observation.
It was shown that abusive parents are more likely to lack
parental warmth, compassion and concern and experi-
ence difficulty in perspective taking, and at the same time,
have less self-confidence, a greater lack of impulse control
and are more narcissistic [135]. It is assumed that patients
with NPD might have reduced affective neural compo-
nent of empathy. Further evidences are needed to validate
this hypothesis.
Autism and Autistic spectrum disorders (ASD)
Autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) is a severe developmen-
tal disorder where there is marked neuro-cognitive
impairment. Children with ASD display a broad range of
social communication deficits, and most scholars agree
that a lack of empathy (taken in a very broad sense) prom-
inently figures amongst them. The underlying cause of the
empathy deficit is, however, more controversial. For
instance, Baron-Cohen and colleagues [136] put forward
the hypothesis that the social impairment in autism arises
from a failure of a mentalizing mechanism (a theory-of-
mind module). Other authors believe that children with
autism have a hard time feeling and expressing emotion,
and that this basic deficit prevents them from engaging in
social interactions [137]. Others still, like Russell [68],
argue that deficits in executive functions are the major
cause for the social/communicative disorders observed in
autism. Rogers and Pennington [138] suggested a cascade
model of autism in which the lack of certain aspects of
interpersonal development at every previous stage dis-
rupts certain developments in the following stage. TheseBioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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authors view early imitation skills, emotion sharing, and
theory of mind as increasingly complex expressions of the
ability to form and coordinate certain representations of
self and other. These representations are then used to
guide the planning and execution of one's own behavior.
Finally, Dawson [139] proposed that autism involves
impairment in attentional functioning for social stimuli
(e.g., facial expressions, speech, gestures). She hypothe-
sized that, because social stimuli are complex, variable,
and unpredictable, children with autism have difficulty
processing and representing them and, therefore, their
attention is not naturally drawn to such stimuli [140].
These different views (imitation/emotions sharing vs.
executive functions) may not be as incompatible as it
seems. Indeed, it remains possible that empathy deficits
in autism are related to disruption of either emotion shar-
ing or mental flexibility/self regulation components, or
even both.
Several studies have examined behavioral and autonomic
responses of children with autism who look at adults
depicting facial emotional expressions (see [141] for a
critical review). While most studies report that children
with autism look less frequently at the adult faces than
control subjects in empathy-eliciting situations, the
remaining findings are equivocal. For instance, one study
did not find any change of heartbeat rate during the obser-
vation of someone in distress [142]. Another study has
shown that the autonomic responses of these children
change according to the distress of the target, if the emo-
tions displayed are not ambiguous and if they are pre-
sented under conditions with reduced distraction [143].
Moreover, and contrary to what is often claimed, children
with autism can make moral/conventional distinction
[144]. It is likely that these children present a difficulty in
taking the perspective of others, which requires executive
resources, but they seem to have the physiological sub-
strate to display affective sharing abilities. Altogether,
both impairment in executive functions and emotion
sharing may account for the empathy deficit in autism.
There is also evidence of deficits in the perception-action
coupling, corresponding to basic level of empathy, like
mimicry. One study has shown that when compared with
developmentally delayed children, 20-month-old infants
with autism were found to be specifically impaired on
empathy task, joint attention and imitation [145]. Imita-
tion deficits have been proposed to explain the difficultly
of autistic children in establishing social relationships and
identifying with others [138]. For instance, a study by
Hobson & Lee [146] demonstrated that autistic children
can imitate the goal of actions displayed by an experi-
menter but failed to imitate the affective style with which
the actions were carried out. This suggests that these chil-
dren cannot readily identify with the experimenter's per-
spective entirely. It has also been demonstrated that long
before children with autism show theory of mind deficits,
they exhibit deficits in joint attention and attention mon-
itoring [147]. A study examined 30 to 70 month-old autis-
tic and healthy children's social behavior, affect, and use
of gaze during naturalistic interactions with their mothers
[148]. Both autistic and typically developing children
responded with smiles more frequently to social events
than to nonsocial events. However, when autistic chil-
dren's responses to the mother's smiles were examined,
the authors found that they never smiled in response to
the mother's smile. In other words, they do not exhibit the
biologically based ability to automatically resonate with
others which consists of very basic level of empathy, indi-
cating their perception-action coupling deficits in a
behavior that is considered as a manifestation of emotion
contagion, like facial mimicry. Another recent study
found that individuals with autism do not show sponta-
neous mimicry, but they perform voluntary mimicry well
[35]. Such a core deficit in involuntary motor resonance
may be the seed for their profound impairment in basic
emotional connectedness.
Burgeoning research efforts suggest that a deficient mirror
neuron system may contribute to motor and social prob-
lems experienced in individuals with ASD. Indeed, brain
areas associated with the mirror-neuron system and imita-
tion have all been observed as aberrant in terms of struc-
ture and function in individuals with ASD. Indeed, recent
research with humans using transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) demonstrates changes in the amplitude of
the motor-evoked potentials during action observation, a
clear demonstration of the motor resonance mechanism
(e.g., [149]). To build on this finding, TMS was applied
over the motor cortex of adults with ASD and matched
healthy controls. Compared to the controls, adults with
ASD showed significantly less M1 activation during the
observation of transitive, meaningless finger movements
[150]. In contrast, observation of the finger movements in
control subjects yielded enhanced M1 activity in areas
delivering signals to the muscles concerned with the
observed action. The weaker M1 modulation in individu-
als with ASD suggests that the less mirror neuron activa-
tion in the motor cortex may be partly responsible for the
deficits in social cognition, specifically abnormal self-
other representations, diminished reciprocal social capac-
ities, and hindered development of empathy. In attempt
to examine a potential link between mirror neuron dys-
function and developmental delay of social cognitive
skills, one fMRI study found a lack of activation in the
inferior frontal gyrus (a key mirror neuron area) in chil-
dren with ASD as compared to controls during the obser-
vation and imitation of basic facial emotion expression
[151]. These recent findings, which need to be replicated,
seem to suggest that dysfunction in the mirror neuron sys-BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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tem may hamper the normal development of self-other
connectedness, creating a cascade of deficient processes
that lead to social deficits, including some aspects of
empathy.
It should be noted that, to date, it is not clear what aspect
of empathy is dysfunctional in ASD, and there is not
enough empirical research that has addressed this ques-
tion. However, as noted above, there are growing evi-
dences suggesting that disruption of both the motor/
affective and meta-cognitive self-regulational aspects of
empathy. Individuals with autism appear to have defi-
ciencies over broader aspects of empathy, although this
notion needs to be clarified in the future.
Alexithymia
Alexithymia refers to deficiencies in understanding,
processing, or describing emotions in the self [152]. Since
awareness of emotional states in the self is a prerequisite
to recognizing such states in others, alexithymia should
involve impairment in empathy. Although alexithymia is
not a diagnostic disorder, it is a personal trait that is prev-
alent in broad psychiatric and psychosomatic spectrums,
which are characterized by deficits in empathy, such as
autistic spectrum disorder [153-155], schizophrenia [156-
161], borderline [162], narcissistic [163] and psycho-
pathic personality disorders [164]. Guttman et al. [162]
also showed that alexithymia scale is correlated with
empathy scale using borderline personality population.
Moriguchi and colleagues [165] showed that alexithymic
people showed low theory of mind ability when they
mentalize the moving triangle animation and, using fMRI,
low neural activity in medial prefrontal cortex, which is
mostly associated with perspective taking scale. Moriguchi
and colleagues [63] further used fMRI to compare neural
response in a group of people with alexithymia with a
group of healthy controls to the visual perception of pic-
tures depicting human hands and feet in painful situa-
tions. The alexithymia group showed less cerebral
activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the
dorsal pons, the cerebellum, and the left caudal anterior
cingulate cortex within the pain matrix. The alexithymia
group showed rather greater activation in the areas related
to affective processing such as the right anterior and pos-
terior insula and inferior frontal gyrus. Furthermore, alex-
ithymic participants scored lower on the pain ratings and
on the scores related to cognitive mature empathy.
Another fMRI study [166] also showed that a population
with alexithymia had lower neural activity in medial pre-
frontal cortex in response to affective pictures, but there is
no difference of activation in the brain areas associated
with bottom up information processing such as limbic
structures (i.e., the amygdala, the hippocampal forma-
tion, and the hypothalamus), which play a central role in
emotional response to simple perceptual and associative
aspects of the stimuli. In sum, alexithymia has certain def-
icits in empathy, particularly in the aspects of mental flex-
ibility to adopt the subjective perspective of the other and
executive and regulatory processes that modulate the sub-
jective feelings associated with emotion. These facts also
support the importance of self-awareness in empathy, and
these cognitive impairments underlie and constitute core
psychopathology related to the social and interpersonal
difficulties in various psychiatric disorders listed above.
Taken together, the available empirical evidence from the
various forms of empathy disorders in psychiatry popula-
tion fits neatly with a multiple-component model. It fur-
ther reveals that there are important differences in the
cognitive and neural systems involved in the cognitive
and affective architecture of empathy and its social behav-
ioral outcomes. We believe that such an approach is an
invaluable research tool with respect to the understand-
ing, and ultimately the therapy/treatment of this disorder.
Conclusion
Empathy is a fundamental ability for social interaction
and moral reasoning. It refers to an emotional response
that is produced by the emotional state of another indi-
vidual without losing sight of whose feelings belong to
whom. This response is contingent on cognitive, as well as
emotional, factors and involves parallel and distributed
processing in a number of dissociable computational
mechanisms. Like many complex experiences, empathy
emerges from the flow and integration of information
between specific brain circuits. Current trends in empathy
Table 1: Clearing up conceptual issues. Despite the abundance of definitions of empathy, it is possible and recommended to 
differentiate emotional contagion, empathy, sympathy and personal distress
- Emotional contagion is tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those 
of another individual.
- Empathy is an emotional response that stems from another's state and that is congruent with the other's emotional state. It involves at least a 
minimal distinction between self and other. Empathy is not a separate emotion by itself, but a kind of induction process by which emotions, both 
positive and negative, are shared, and which increase the chances of similar behaviors in the observer.
- Personal distress is an aversive state (e.g., anxiety, worry) that has not to be congruent with the other's state, and that leads to a self-oriented, 
egoistic reaction.
- Sympathy (or empathic concern) refers to feelings of sorrow, or sorry for another. It is often the consequence of empathy, although it is 
possible that sympathy results from cognitive perspective taking. Sympathy is believed to involve an other-oriented, altruistic motivation.
- Emotion can be considered a process that facilitates appropriate physiological responses to aid the survival of the organism.BioPsychoSocial Medicine 2007, 1:22 http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/1/1/22
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theory suggest that it involves partly dissociable compo-
nents, including shared neural affective representations,
self-awareness, mental flexibility, and emotion regula-
tion. These basic macro-components of empathy are
mediated by specific and interacting neural systems.
These macro-components may comprise more elementary
components that future social neuroscience studies in
combination with clinical research will elucidate. Moreo-
ver, because this model assumes that empathy relies on
dissociable information processing components, it pre-
dicts a variety of structural or functional dysfunctions
depending on which aspect is disrupted. Indeed, there are
various forms of empathy dysfunctions in psychopathol-
ogy such as antisocial personality disorders, psychopathy,
narcissistic personality disorders and autism, which seem
to reflect selective impairment of one or several compo-
nents of the neurocognitive architecture of empathy.
The lack of empathy leads to profound disturbance and
dysfunction in social interaction, and hence is important
to study in the domain of psychopathology. Future clini-
cal investigations of empathy disorders can only be
informative if behavioral, dispositional and biological
factors are combined. Multiple levels of analysis are fun-
damental when addressing such a complex aspect of psy-
chology. Too often, the assessment of empathy in both
healthy and psychiatric populations relies on self-report
measures that alone are not valid. Further, empathy may
be a prerequisite for altruism, but the relation between
empathy and prosocial motivation is far from being sim-
ple and direct. Both biology and experience contribute to
empathy and sympathy in complex interactive, bidirec-
tional ways.
Finally, one of the challenges for a social neuroscience
approach to empathy and its disorders is the difficulty of
taking into account situational variables. To provide inter-
pretable data, neuroscience experiments require intra-
individual comparisons and repeated-measures designs.
To be financially feasible, they require small samples.
These conditions limit opportunities to study the effects
of potentially important situational variables. This is but
one example of the perennial challenge objective science
faces in the attempt to understand human subjectivity in
all its richness and complexity [167].
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